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Abstract
This paper outlines the design of an intraday
market-based mechanism for coordinated scheduling
of gas-fired electric generation, intra-day natural gas
purchases, sales and deliveries, and underlying
pipeline operation. The mechanism is based on an
exchange of physical and pricing data between
participants in each market, with price formation in
both markets being fully consistent with the physics of
energy flow. In organized nodal electricity markets,
prices are consistent with the physical flow of electric
energy in the power grid because the economic
optimization used to clear the market accounts for the
physics of power flows. In the gas system, the
proposed physical operation and pricing will be based
on the transient optimization approach that accounts
for physical and engineering factors of pipeline
hydraulics and compressor station operations. The
paper provides theoretical foundations for the market
mechanism.

1. Introduction
The growing reliance of the bulk electric power
system on gas-fired generation increased the need to
improve the coordination between wholesale natural
gas and electricity markets.
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Replacement of coal fired and nuclear plants with
gas-fired generating capacity significantly increases the
amount of natural gas used as fuel for power
generation. In parallel, the variability of electric
generation from wind and solar increases the
variability of pipeline deliveries to gas-fired generators
used to balance the electric grid. The resulting intraday and even sub-hourly swings in demand for natural
gas as a fuel for electric generation create new
challenges for pipeline operators, and - poses reliability
risks for both gas pipelines and electric systems.
The need to better coordinate -both sectors to
mitigate these risks is well recognized, and is reflected
in the - Orders 787 and 809 by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC), which regulates
access to pipeline capacity [1,2].
Coordination
mechanisms proposed to date are based on widening
the scope of operational information exchanges
between the –two sectors, and on adjusting the timing
of these exchanges [3]. While these measures are
helpful, a truly efficient coordination should be based
on timely exchange of both physical and pricing data,
with price formation in both markets being fully
consistent with the physics of energy flow.
Electricity prices consistent with the physical flow
of electric energy in the power grid are the outcome of
economic optimization of power system operation in
organized electricity markets administered by Regional
Transmission Organizations (RTOs) [4, 5]. A similar
optimization approach that accounts for physical and
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engineering factors of gas pipeline - and compressor
station operations would lead to location- and timedependent economic value of natural gas consistent
with the physics of gas flow. Such an approach have
been formulated in [6] under the simplified assumption
of steady state pipeline flows. A more general
formulation considers a truly dynamic transient flow of
natural gas
This paper relies on Ref. [8] in which a transient
pipeline optimization problem that maximizes total
market surplus over supply and offtake schedules has
been formulated.
Market Surplus in this context is
defined as the sum of the producer/supplier surplus and
consumer/buyer surplus. Producer surplus is derived
whenever the price the producer receives exceeds the
value they are willing to accept for the goods they sell.
Similarly, consumer surplus is derived whenever the
price the consumer ends up paying for a good is below
the value they are prepared to pay. Market surplus is
the sum of individual surpluses over all
consumers/buyers and producers/sellers participating
in the market.
The appropriate transient optimization solution
dynamically allocates pipeline capacity among
transactions between suppliers and consumers based on
the economic value of these transactions. Compressor
operations and line pack are optimized in conjunction
with the selection of location-dependent offers to sell,
and bids to buy, natural gas. Location-based (nodal)
prices of natural gas are computed as dual variables
corresponding to the nodal flow balance constraints in
the optimal solution, and reflect the time- and locationdependent economic value of gas in the network.
Reference [8] introduces the Locational Trade Values
(LTVs) of natural gas as shadow prices of the nodal
flow balance constraints. One of the key results of that
paper is the proof of the revenue adequacy of the
market settlement mechanism based on LTVs.
The objective of the current paper is to introduce
the proposed design of the Gas Balancing Market
(GBM) as a critical element for economically efficient
gas-electric
coordination.
This
coordination
mechanism will facilitate the timely exchange of both
physical and pricing data between participants in each
market, with price formation in both markets being
fully consistent with the physics of energy flow.
Physical data would be intra-day (e.g., hourly) gas
schedules (burn and delivery) and pricing data would
be bids and offers reflecting willingness to pay and to
accept. Location-based gas prices would be obtained
using optimization of transient pipeline flow models.
Inputs to the pipeline optimization problem include
prices that power plants are willing to pay for gas, as
derived from nodal electricity prices that are produced
by power system optimization.

2. Gas Balancing Market
2.1. Motivation
Electric and natural gas networks follow distinct
but inter-related decision processes of scheduling their
operations. The timeline of these processes are
schematically presented in Fig. 1. As one can see in
this timeline, there exists a highly intricate succession
of decision cycles on the electric side and natural gas
side. A gas-fired generating unit considering to operate
on the next electric day (which begins at midnight)
should submit an offer to the Day-Ahead market on the
prior day by 10:30 AM Eastern Time. Prior to that, the
asset manager for the unit would line up gas supply
and delivery. Supply will be arranged at a pipeline
receipt point at a bilaterally negotiated price. Shipment
of gas from the receipt point to the delivery point on
the pipeline could be arranged on a firm basis through
the capacity release mechanism or on a non-firm basis
by obtaining interruptible capacity. This process yields
a preliminary supply arrangements and gas prices.
These prices, although not backed up by delivery
guarantee, inform electric generators on how to bid in
the day-ahead (DA) electricity market. This process
exposes transacting parties to various kinds of risk.
Once the DA market clears and the financially
binding operational schedules for electric generators
are determined, generators have just enough time to
make delivery nominations with the pipeline for the
next gas day. If the nominations are confirmed in the
Timely and/or Evening cycles on the gas side, daily
delivery quantities are essentially guaranteed.
However, even if confirmed, the quantities needed by
the generator may be different from those preliminary
arranged and the difference must be settled between
the parties.
If deliveries needed by the generator are not
confirmed due to pipeline capacity limitations,
generators will face significant financial exposure as
they are obligated to deliver power but have no gas to
produce it. This financial exposure is two-fold:
generator may need to acquire under-delivered power
in the real-time market and also may be facing nonperformance penalties if the electric under-delivery
occurs at the time of scarcity.
Even if the daily delivery quantity is confirmed, the
pipeline typically expects that gas will be taken in
equal quantities in each hour of the gas day (a ratable
quantity).
Generators, however, need non-ratable
quantity which pipelines may be able to accommodate
but cannot guarantee.
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Furthermore, most fast-start combined cycle
generators and gas turbine peaking facilities are not
committed in the DA market. Instead those units are
typically scheduled through the hourly reliability
updates or close to the real-time market. These “lastminute” decisions simply do not fit into the existing
decision cycles on the gas side. For these generators
which are critical for maintaining reliability of the
electric service and providing essential ancillary
services there is no transparent mechanism on the gas
side under which they can purchase gas and schedule
delivery as needed. Sudden ramps required by these
generators may cause operational problems on the
pipeline side. If these generators receive no gas, this
will jeopardize operational reliability of the electrical
grid, while delivering gas to these units may jeopardize
reliability of the pipeline system.
We propose to solve these problems through the
formation of the hour-by-hour natural gas balancing
market that would allow market participants to trade
deviations from approved ratable schedules in the
Timely and Evening Cycles.
These deviations could be traded through the
formal optimization based auction-type market
mechanism as described in the next section. Such an
auction could be run on an hourly basis using a rolling
horizon approach, such that each hour the auction
would optimize the system for multiple hours (e.g. 36
hours or even more). Such a balancing market would
provide a repeated forward-looking price discovery
mechanism to help the gas and electric sectors to
efficiently coordinate their operations.

2.2. Gas Balancing Market in Words
The proposed Gas Balancing Market (GBM) will
have voluntary participation and will be administered
by a pipeline specific market administrator.
GBM will function as a two-sided auction
conducted on the gas pipeline network and
administered by the Market Operator. Network nodes
are primarily custodial meters where gas change hands,
compressor stations and pipe interconnection points.
Network edges are pipes physically connecting nodes.
Auction participants are buyers and sellers of gas
submitting price/quantity (P/Q) offers/bids to sell/buy
gas at network nodes. Their buy/sell positions are
primarily driven by the need to buy gas above the
ratable schedules or the desire to sell gas in excess of
ratable schedules. Thus, the same market participant
may act as a buyer in one hours and as a seller in
another hour. Ratable schedules would be based on
deliveries confirmed at the Timely or Evening
nomination cycle. In addition, the market would allow

participation of buyers and sellers which have no dayahead confirmed schedules or firm capacity rights.
Offers and bids are submitted with an hourly time
step for a multi-hour optimization horizon (e.g., 36
hours).
Auctioneer’s objective function is to maximize,
over the optimization horizon, the market surplus
between accepted bids and offers less compressor costs
of running the pipeline.
The auction repeats periodically (e.g. every hour)
as shown in Fig. 2, which also depicts the transition of
this repeated auction from one gas day to another.
The optimization problem is formulated subject to
the dynamic transient pipeline flow equations and must
satisfy key engineering constraints. The latter are
limitations on the maximum allowed operating
pressure at each pipe, minimum pressure requirements
at each node, horsepower limitations and compression
ratios of compressors.
The outcome of the auction includes:
 Hourly schedules for receipt and deliveries of
natural gas over the optimization horizon for each
buyer and seller and for each node of the network.
These schedules are the net results of ratable
schedules and buy/sell positions cleared in the
market;
 Hourly shadow prices of nodal mass balance
equations referred to as Locational Trade Values
(LTVs) of natural gas;
 Operational compressor setting and compression
ratios for each compressor station;
 Pressure dynamics at pipes and nodes;
 Market clearing for the first hour of the
optimization horizon will be ex post to actual
deliveries in that hour. Market clearings for all
subsequent hours of that horizon will be ex ante;
 All cleared positions for all hours of the
optimization horizon will be financially binding.
These market results will be financially binding, thus
giving gas buyers and sellers assurance of obtaining
needed gas or liquidating an excess supply at a price
that is acceptable and known ahead of the delivery.
Since the market is cleared multiple times for the same
period, future uncertainties are resolved. This is
because the positions taken in earlier instances of the
GBM could be liquidated at a later time if necessary.
In sum, the proposed market structure will provide a
transparent and efficient mechanism for nearly realtime gas trading and corresponding price discovery.
The proposed GBM timing is aligned with
nomination cycles that are in place for natural gas
pipeline in the United States. The first trading of a
particular GBM cycle is aligned with the completion of
the Evening Nomination Cycle (21:00 Central Time)
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and would have an optimization horizon of 36 hours
which will cover the remaining portion of the current
gas day (from 21:00 to 09:00 of the following day) and
the entire gas day from 09:00 of the following day to
09:00 of the day after. The next trading will occur at
22:00 and will have an optimization horizon of 35
hours also ending at 09:00 of the day after the
following day.
Because the optimization is conducted subject to
the gas flow physics and engineering constraints,
market clearing assures feasibility of delivery
schedules identified.

3. The GBM Optimization Problem
3.1. Pipeline Network Representation
The GBM market clearing process is designed as a
large-scale, system-wide transient optimization of a
pipeline network operation. Although we employ
several simplifications for the purpose of this paper,
the modeling can be extended to capture more complex
physical and engineering aspects. Specifically, we
assume isothermal flow through a horizontal pipeline
with constant gas composition, and where gas
compressibility is specified using the CNGA method in
the equation of state [10, 11]. We also assume that
flow changes are sufficiently slow so as not to excite
waves or shocks, so that second order terms may be
removed from the dynamic equations, and relatively
coarse discretizations in both space and time may be
used. The important parameters for a pipe are length,
diameter, and the Colebrook-White friction factor. The
dynamics of gas flow within the pipe can then be
modeled using the isothermal Euler equations in one
dimension, with the inertia and gravity terms omitted
[12,13].
For simplicity in this paper, compressor stations
and regulator elements are modeled as two-ended flow
devices that can enforce the given time-dependent
pressures on a specified side, such as the discharge
pressure. Theoretical power for compressors is
computed as a simple function of volumetric flow rate
and
compression
ratio  ,
given
by


|  | [max(1,  h1)  1] , where h=(γ-1)/γ, and γ is the
specific heat capacity ratio of the gas. In this paper we
do not model removal of gas from the pipeline to fuel
compressor station operation, as it is a relatively small
quantity of the through-flow (e.g. 0.25%) and does not
significantly affect marginal prices.
We consider a system of pipes, compressors, and
regulators that are connected at nodes. Within the
pipes, the mass flux and density evolve according to

the simplified Euler equations. This collection of
elements connected at nodes is considered as a directed
graph G=(V,E), where each segment e={i,j}∈E is
an edge that connects two nodes i and j in the set of
nodes V. The instantaneous state within an edge is
characterized by the pressure pij and flow ij , which
for pipes are functions of both time on an interval [0,
T] and space on an interval [0, Le], where T is the
optimization horizon and Le is the length of pipe
segment e. We assign a positive flow direction on each
pipe, and then derive equations that relate the pressure
and flow at the boundaries of a pipe segment to the
conditions at a node. Each node is classified as either a
pressure (slack) node j∈V P, where a pressure profile pj
in time is specified and flow is a free variable, or a
flow node j∈VF, where the time-dependent flow dj
entering or leaving the network is specified and
pressure is free. At least one pressure node must be
included in the model so that there is a degree of
freedom in flow to ensure that the initial value problem
in simulations used to validate the optimization
solution is well-posed. This will typically be a large
source point, such as a supply interconnection or
storage unit, where the pressure is a given boundary
condition. An illustration and a more detailed
description of the variables used in such reduced nodal
modeling are illustrated in Figure 3. Each node must
satisfy the Kirchhoff-Neumann flow balance condition
that requires mass moving through the node to be
conserved. This stipulates that the sum of incoming
flows is equal to the sum of outgoing flows plus any
consumption dj at that node. Each specified flow node
j∈VD is also assigned an internal nodal pressure, pj
which serves as an auxiliary variable. A compressor
can boost the pressure difference between pipe
segments attached at its inlet and outlet nodes. This
induces extra compatibility equations into the
description of the coupled system of differential
equations.
Numerical simulations using the referenced
representation of pipeline networks are validated in [9]
where simulated results are benchmarked against
SCADA measurements for a segment of Tennessee
pipeline.

3.2. Optimization Problem Formulation
We formulate an optimal control problem (OCP)
subject to partial differential equation (PDE)
constraints for gas pipeline networks, for which the
edge dynamics and nodal conditions described above
form the dynamic constraints. The aim is to maximize
an economic objective function in the form of the
market surplus. This market surplus is maximized in
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total over the optimization horizon [0,T] which may be
a 24-hour day or longer. At each point in time, market
surplus is computed as the difference between the the
economic value consumers (buyers) are placing on
(willing to pay for) gas purchases
at nodes j
minus the value of gas which producers (sellers) are
placing on (willing to accept for) gas sales
at
nodes j. The inputs to the problem consist of the bid
and offer prices
and
, respectively that
buyers or sellers at a node j are willing to pay or accept
at time t within the optimization horizon [0,T]. In
addition to price bids, quantity bids are also supplied in
the form of pre-existing contracts
, minimum

care of at a local level. The optimization problem is
stated as follows:

and maximum offtake curves
and
of buyers, and minimum and maximum supply curves
and
of suppliers. The economic
objective is maximized subject to a collection of
constraints that describe pipeline system operation, and
where the control variables include compression ratios
of gas compressors or compression ratios in
the system. The PDE dynamics for gas flow on each
pipe (i,j) are enforced, as well as flow balance at each
node j and pressure changes caused by compression.
Inequality constraints include minimum and maximum
limits on pressure on each pipe, maximum power limits
of each compressor, and maximum and minimum
withdrawals or injections for buyers and sellers. For
simplicity, we choose terminal conditions on the state
and control variables to be time-periodic. Alternative
initial and terminal conditions such as mass balance
over the optimization period on certain subsystems
could be included instead.
Crucially, we assume that no discrete changes to
the network topology occur during the optimization
period. Thus, no discrete variables, such as binary
on/off switches, are included in the formulation. While
compressor stations are in reality subject to complex
operational limitations, we demonstrate that, in
principle, nonlinear station constraints can be included
in a computationally tractable manner as long as the
modeling does not include on/off variables. For
instance, a large compressor station with multiple (e.g.
a dozen or more) units that receive flow from a
common feeder and deliver flow to a common header
can be modeled as a single theoretical boost ratio for
the purpose of optimization. Modern compressor
stations often have control systems that can be set to
track a set point or reference signal for discharge
pressure or horsepower. Thus we suppose that the
management of individual units is automated, and
focus on the large-scale system effects of control
actions while supposing that subsystems can be taken

tij   x ij   Z ( pij )RTw

Maximization of market surplus
T

T

jV 0

jV 0

max   c dj (t)dˆ j (t)dt    c sj (t )ˆ
s j (t )dt

(1)

Mass conservation
t ij   xij  0 , (i, j)  E .

(2)

s.t.

Momentum conservation

fijij | ij |
2 Dij pij

, (i, j)  E. (3)

Equation of state
pij  Z( pij )RTw ij , (i, j)  E.

(4)

Nodal flow balance
 Ajk  jk (t)   Aijij (t)  q j (t)
j  j

i  j

(sˆj (t )  dˆj (t ))  0 , j  V .
Compressor boost
pij (t)  ij (t) pi (t ) , (i, j)  E,

pij (t)  ij (t) p j (t ),

(5)

(6)

(i, j)  E.

Pressure limits

pijmin  pij (t, 0)  pijmax , (i, j)  E,
pijmin  pij (t, Lij )  pijmax , (i, j)  E.

(7)

Boost upper limits



|  (t) | ( (t))  1  E

 ij | ij (t) | (ij (t))h  1  Eijmax , (i, j)  E,
 ij

h

ij

ij

max
ij

, (i, j)  E.

(8)
Boost lower limits
ij (t)  1, ij (t)  1 (i, j)  E .

(9)

Supply limits

smin
(t)  ˆ
s j (t)  smax
(t) .
j
j

(10)

Demand limits

d min
(t)  dˆ j (t)  d max
(t) .
j
j

(11)

Additional constraints that require the total mass
of gas in the system at the end of the optimization
horizon to return to the initial state may be added.
Equations (1) – (11) use the following notations:
V : set of nodes
E : set of pipes
T : length of the optimization horizon
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R : gas constant (depends on gas gravity)
temperature
(assumed
constant
Tw : working
throughout the system)
Z () : gas compressibility as a function of pressure
(working temperature)
fij : Colebrook-White friction on pipe (i, j)
Dij : diameter of pipe (i, j)
Aij : cross-sectional area of pipe (i, j)
Lij : length of pipe (i, j)
c sj : supply offer price at node j at time t
c dj :demand bid price at node j at time t

ˆ
s j (t ), dˆ j (t ) : variable supply and demand at node j at
time t

ij (t, x) : density on pipe (i, j) at time t and location
x

pij (t, x) : pressure on pipe (i, j) at time t and location
x

ij (t, x) : mass flux on pipe (i, j) at time t and
location x

pij (t), pij (t) : pressure at the inlet and outlet of pipe
(i, j) at time t

ij (t), ij (t) : mass flux at the inlet and outlet of pipe
(i, j) at time t

pijmin , pijmax : minimum and maximum pressure on pipe
(i, j)

 ij ,  ij :

compressor

energy

usage

factor

of

compressors at the inlet and outlet of pipe (i, j)

ij (t), ij (t) : boost ratios of compressors at the inlet
and outlet of pipe (i, j)

h : compressor energy function exponent (depends on
gas specific eat capacity ratio)

Eijmax , Eijmax :

maximum energy (horsepower) of

compressors at the inlet and outlet of pipe (i, j)

s min
(t), s max
(t) : minimum and maximum supply from
j
j
node j at time t

d min
(t), d max
(t) : minimum and maximum demand at
j
j
node j at time t

4. On the Coordination Dynamics
The coordination dynamics between the gas and
electric networks could be envisioned as a periodic
exchange of physical and pricing information.
Consider the end of the Evening Cycle as a point at
which GBM has the longest optimization horizon
which lasts through the end of the current gas day and
through the next gas day (total of 36 hours). Once this
cycle of the GBM clears, it yields a 36-hour long
projection of LTVs. Gas-fired generators could use
these LTVs to update their real-time bids to the
electricity market for the next hour and to update their
gas purchasing decisions for future hours in which the
generator may have been scheduled to operate as an
outcome of the previously cleared DA market.
While Generators can use LTVs to develop their
price offers in the electric market, they can use electric
LMPs to develop bids and offers in the GBM. Indeed,
consider a generating unit scheduled in the DA market
to operate in a future hour. Its projected gas use in that
hour is greater than the daily ratable quantity (total
daily gas use divided by 24) and therefore in that hour,
the generator needs to purchase gas in the balancing
market. The price the generator will be willing to pay
for that additional gas could be as high as
Cmax  (LMP  R  VOM ) / H
where Cmax is the gas price ceiling, LMP is the electric
LMP at the generator’s node, VOM is the non-fuel
variable operating and maintenance costs of generator,
and H is the generator’s heat rate. The term R
reflects an additional risk premium generators would
factor into their willingness to pay for gas to avoid
excess charges they may face in the real-time
electricity market and potentially high nonperformance penalties during scarcity events.
Additional risk factor may be needed for cycling
generators at times when they operate at their
minimum capacity when electricity prices that are too
low to recover their operating costs.
On the other hand, if in a future hour the generator is
long on gas (for example, if it is not scheduled to
operate in that hour but it is still expected to take a
ratable quantity of gas), it will be willing to sell that
gas in the GBM. Simplistically, the price floor the
generator may be willing to accept could be as low as
zero, although dynamic consideration and/or
opportunity/obligations to provide ancillary services
may affect these pricing considerations.
Even a relatively simplistic coordination mechanism
as described here will likely result in an improved
overall gas-electric system efficiency. Indeed, pipeline
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congestion will be reflected in higher LTVs at certain
locations.
Generating units taking gas at these
locations will see higher hourly prices and translate
those into higher bids submitted to the electricity
market. Electric System Operator could respond by
reducing output of such generators and to the extent
possible will be replacing them with generation with
lower cost of gas or other fuels. That in turn will
reduce demand for natural gas at constrained pipeline
locations and therefore relieve pipeline congestion and
reduce natural gas prices to other consumers.

5. Policy Implications
The design of the proposed GBM mechanism is
particularly suitable for the regulatory structure and
market design currently in place in the United States.
GBM will require minimal regulatory reform and is
intended to keep the existing and vibrant market
structure in place in the USA intact.
As stated earlier in Section 2.2, we envision GBM as
a pipeline-specific market which does not necessarily
require the formation of a regional organization to
coordinate the operations of several interconnected
pipelines. GBM can be instituted at a pipeline level
and could also be set to serve only a part of the
pipeline system, to simplify an initial implementation.
We propose also that participation in the GBM be
voluntary. Market participants that are satisfied with
the existing operational and market mechanism are not
required to submit bids or offers into the GBM.
We chose the proposed timing associated with the
GBM decision cycles to minimize its impact on the
operation of the current market and scheduling
decision cycles. GBM will have little or no operational
overlap with the existing day-ahead trading of natural
gas, supply nominations and scheduling. By design,
GBM is a market that is added to where none exists.
These factors should reduce the hurdles for
implementing the GBM within the regulatory structure
of interstate pipelines regulated by FERC and possibly
by intrastate pipeline in jurisdiction of state regulators,
Participation in the GBM offers benefits to market
participations both on the gas side and on the electric
side. On the gas side, the GBM will provide relief of
pipeline
constraints
through
LTV-sensitive
optimization of compressors helping to determine the
most efficient line pack strategy over time and across
the system to assure higher delivery to locations with
the highest value of gas. At the same time, redispatch
of electric generation in response to dynamically
formed LTVs will provide additional relief of pipeline
constraints. In the long run, creation of the GBM will
help pipeline customers make investment decisions.
Gas-fired generators, especially those owned by the

Independent Power Producers, are reluctant to enter
long-term contracts for Firm Transportation capacity.
Generation owners are exposed to a significant
financial risk of not being able to recover fixed cost
costs associated with holding FT transportation rights
at the time when the power plant is running. The
existing capacity release mechanism and daily pricing
structure do not provide sufficient price granularity to
help generating companies appropriately evaluate the
risk of making a decision to acquire long-term FT
rights. With the GBM in place, a generating company
can rely on the associated price discovery mechanism
with hourly granularity to assess the value of FT rights
when those are under-utilized. That risk exposure
could be compared to the risk exposure on the electric
side and associated with the generator nonperformance due to inability to acquire gas deliveries.
LTV-based pricing will help pipeline owners to
better identify constrained system elements with better
granularity.
Using LTV-based pricing, pipeline
owners could more precisely assess economic benefits
of alternative solutions and justify investments in
economic solutions before regulatory agencies.
On the electric side, gas-fired generators could rely
on hourly gas trade values (LTVs) to support bidding
into DA and RT markets leading to a more efficient
commitment and dispatch of the electrical grid.
Relying on GBM will simplify gas purchases for gasfired fast-start power plants that clear in the real-time
power markets and/or that are called upon to provide
ancillary services. Redispatch of electric generation
will reduce electricity prices in response to high gas
LTV under scarcity caused by pipeline constraints.
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Figure 1. Gas-Electric Decision Cycles

Figure 2. Succession of GMB clearings
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Figure 3 – Diagram of nodal control system modeling for large-scale gas transmission
pipelines. Given a directed graph that represents the pipeline network, p ij and pij represent
pressures at the sending and receiving ends of each pipe, while  ij and ij represent mass flux
at the sending and receiving ends of each pipe. The quantities  ij and  ij represent pressure
boost ratios of compressors that are, without loss of generality, located at every interface
between a node and a pipe. Thus, nodal pressures pi and p j are related to pipe endpoint
pressures p ij and pij according to p ij   ij pi and pij   ij p j . The withdrawal from the
network at a node j is denoted by d j , which is constructed from pre-existing contracts q j (t )
and secondary supply and demand profiles sˆ (t ) and dˆ (t ) , or the supply injected at a node i
j

j

is denoted by s j .
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